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I.
Employer/Surety is correct

ST A TEMENT
identifying that

standard set out in Idaho

Code § 72-451 for psychological injuries is a more rigorous standard than is outlined by Idaho
Code title 72 for physical industrial injuries. The Legislature set out a different causation
standard in Idaho Code §72-451 for psychological injuries than physical injuries. When
addressing a physical injury a Claimant must show that the "injury she claims benefits for is
causally related to an accident occmTing in the course of employment." Shubert v. Macy's West
_Idaho_ (2015), 343 P.3d 1099, 1107, citing Hart v. Kaman Bearing Supply, 130 Idaho
296,939 P.2d 1375 (1997). l.C. § 72-451 requires that the Claimant show that the "accident and
injury must be the predominant cause as compared to all causes." Under the workers
compensation system a Claimant must show with physical injuries simply a causal relationship
between the accident and the injury, while with psychological injuries the Claimant must show
that the accident and/or related physical injury is the predominate cause of the psychological
mJury.
This predominant cause standard has been interpreted as requiring the industrial injury
and accident to be at least 51 % of the cause of the psychological condition.

Benner vs. Home

Depot, Inc., 2013 IIC 0002.21 ,i 92. The Commission and the testimony offered has focused on
the effect of the industrial chronic pain injury on the Claimant's psychological wellbeing, but
I.C. § 72-451 (3) is not so limiting as it requires that the examination of whether "such accident
and injury" is the predominant cause. In the workers compensation system the tenns "accident"
and "injury" have distinct definitions given meaning by the Idaho Legislature. l.C. 72-
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18)(a)-(c). The

though imposing a higher standard than in

claims, still sought a holistic causation evaluation, not one narrmvly focused on
one element. Though the issue in this case is narrow, adopting a narrow focus limited to just the
evaluation of expert opinions, without addressing the factually relevant context that those
opinions were offered in, is error.

II.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

Claimant laid out in his briefing before the Commission that this case is one that turns on
the support and interpretation of expert testimony.

Employer/Surety wishes to present this

matter as one of strictly the evaluation of "expert testimony" to the exclusion of the other
evidence in the record, that is inconsistent with the Court's recommendation. The Court has
directed that evaluation of evidence, especially credibility of witnesses and opinions is to be
based upon "substantial consistency supported by other evidence in the record." Clark v. Shari's
Management C01p, 155 Idaho 576, 581, 314 P.3d 632, 637 (2013). Evaluation of the credibility

of evidence is not something to be compartmentalized. Such detenninations are to be based
upon the totality of the evidence in the record. This is a standard that the Commission has
routinely used in past cases.

Melugin v. Ag Express, Inc., 2014 IIC 0032.10; Brennen v.

Selkirk Press, Inc., 2012 IIC 0009.18; Henry v. Department of Corrections 2011 IIC 0045.18;
Tim Miller v. Adecco 2009 IIC 0097.8; Resindez v. Challenger Pallet, 2005 IIC 0246.8. Where

the totality of the evidence demonstrates that the Commission's findings and conclusions,
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on credibility, were clearly erroneous, such findings are to be reversed as
made on the basis of

were not

and

Employer/Surety assc1is that Claimant is asking the Comi to "second guess" the
Industrial Commission's weighing of Dr. Calhoun's testimony, and cites Lorca-Merono v. Yokes

Washington Foods, Inc, 137 Idaho 446, 455, 50 P.3d 461, 470 (2002) for the proposition that
such "second guessing" should be expressly rejected. Employer/Surety misstates the standard
outlined in Lorca-Merono when evaluating a Commission's findings regarding expert opinions.
In Lorca-Merono the Referee authored an opinion placing weight on one set of physicians (Drs.
Kody, Watkins and Hahn). The Commission did not choose to adopt the opinion authored by the
Referee and instead authored its own opinion placing weight instead on Dr. Lindem's opinion.
The dispute on appeal was whether the Commission itself had authority to disregard the
Referee's unadopted findings. The Court held that the Commission had authority to adopt its
own findings and weigh credibility. The Court set out the standard for its evaluation of the
Commission's decision as follows:
The findings of fact made by the referee were merely recommendations to the
Industrial Commission. Upon reviewing those findings it could either adopt them
or enter its own findings. The Commission need not explain why it did not adopt
certain findings recommended by the referee. The Industrial Commission, as the
fact finder, is free to detennine the weight to be given to the testimony of a
medical expert. The Commission is not bound to accept the opinion of a treating
physician over that of a physician who merely examined the claimant for the
pending litigation. We will not disturb the Commission's conclusion as to the
weight and credibility of expert testimony unless such conclusions are clearly
erroneous. Lorca-Merono, at 451. (Citations omitted).
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The standard which the Court set out is not one which never re-evaluates expe1i
testimonial evidence, but instead evaluates it whether it \:ms "clearly erroneous" to rely upon
such evidence.

The Court has further clarified when evaluating witnesses before a non-jury

tribunal that
"in detennining whether a finding is clearly erroneous this Court does not weigh
the evidence as the district corni did. The corni inquires whether the findings of
fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. This Court will not
substitute its view of the facts for the view of the district judge. Evidence is
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it
in detennining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Shawver v.
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004).
(Citations omitted).

The U.S. Supreme Court has also explained the clearly erroneous standard.

"A finding is

'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and finn conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

The law allows the Court to

reexamine the evidence before the Commission including testimonial evidence. Such an
examination is to detennine whether "a mistake has been committed" or whether the decision
reached was one which a reasonable trier of fact could not arrive at. This examination is based
on the "entire evidence." If the Court detennines that a mistake has been committed, the finding
should be reversed, even as to the weight given to a witnesses' testimony.
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A. The Industrial Commission's Wholesale Reliance upon Dr. Calhoun's 50/50
Analvsis was Clearly Erroneous Based on the Totalitv of the Evidence, Including
Evidence the Commission Found Undisputed and Persuasive, and is Therefore not
Based on Substantial and Competent Evidence.

The trier of fact is required to examine all of the evidence when evaluating credibility.
Employer/Surety seeks to take Claimant's Counsel's own words out of context regarding the
proper evaluation of the Claimant's pre-existing psychological condition. (Employer/Surety's
Responsive Brief, p. 24-25).

As outlined in Claimant's Counsel's brief, and outlined above,

proper evaluation of Claimant's pre-existing psychological condition, requires an examination of
the "entire evidence," not just one medical opinion.

Additionally, proper evaluation of that

medical opinion, Dr. Calhoun's, requires an examination of the "entire evidence."
Dr. Calhoun's opinion alone demonstrates that the Industrial accident and related injuries
are the predominate cause of Claimant's psychologic condition. The Commission's analysis of
Dr. Calhoun's opinion is erroneous, as based on the totality of the evidence it is logically
unsound.

The Commission rejected Claimant's argument that Claimant's depression is caused

50% by the Claimant's chronic pain condition due the industrial accident and at least 1% caused
by Claimant's anger, hostility, resentfulness and dysthymia, resulting in the Industrial accident
and injury being the predominant cause of the Claimant's depression. The Commission rejected
this argument because it supposed it would require the rejection of Dr. Calhoun's opinion, which
it thought well-founded. The Commission also stated it rejected such an ar.!:,rtllnent because Dr.
Calhoun specifically rejected such an interpretation of his opinion. (Findings, p. 12). Claimant's
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Calhoun's op11110n; rather it calls for it to be

does not reqmre a rejection of
interpreted in light of the entire

of the

Additionally, Dr. Calhoun did not

specifically "reject" this interpretation of his opinion; he instead relied upon circular logic to
conclude that the Claimant "was given the opportunity to be treated" for any such personality
changes due to the accident and/or injury had received treatment, though the Dr. Calhoun at the
same time stated that such treatment was ineffective because of the Claimant's mistrust and
hostility. (Calhoun Depo., pp. 27-28, II. 24-11 ).
Dr. Calhoun opined that 50% of the Claimant's psychological condition was due to the
industrial injury.

He then stated that the other 50% was due to the Claimant's "personality

traits." (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 63).

In his report Dr. Calhoun does not specify the source of

these "personality traits," only following in Consideration/Recommendation 2 of that report does
Dr. Calhoun opine, making a legal detennination not a medical one, that "thus" the June 13,
2008 injury is not the predominate cause of the Claimant's current depression. Id. In his post
hearing deposition testimony Dr. Calhoun opined that the Claimant's "mistrust and cynicism,
hostility and dysthymia," were a "preexisting pattern." (Calhoun Depo., p. 28, 11. 10-11 ).
Dr. Calhoun's opinion places two categories of cause to the Claimant's current
psychological depressive condition: (1) "Mr Gerdon's industrial accident and subsequent pain
disorder" and (2) "Mr. Gerdon's personality traits." (Claimant Exhibit 2, p. 63). Each exactly
equally weighted as the cause of the Claimant's current depressive disorder on a 50/50 basis.
Claimant outlined to the Commission and to this Court in his Appellant's Brief that
apportioning all of Claimant's personality traits as being a pre-existing cause of the Claimant's
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depression is inconsistent not only with the record in its entirety but with the Commission's own
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Employer/Surety asserts that such a reading of the

record is taking one portion of Dr. Calhoun's testimony out of context. The portion of Dr.
Calhoun's deposition transcript frequently cited by Claimant in his brief is simply the most
obvious example of the error committed. Other portions of the record also lead to the same
conclusion, including other portions of Dr. Calhoun's testimony.
When discussing the Claimant's evaluation for the WorkSTAR program Dr. Calhoun
explained:
A: Yes. I would just say that while he was in the WorkSTAR program, we
were starting to look at his frustration in reaction to pain, his fear of pain and
movement. We were also trying to get him to come off some of his pain
medications, which was very overwhelming for him. We also addressed his
tendency to anticipate the future anxiously and cynically, and then again, bringing
that back on how that can exacerbate his pain.
I would say those were the primary issues. And then trying to get him to
move away from anger, as far as being such a readily available and frequent
emotion for him.
Q: So what causes a person to have these types of issues that Mr. Gerdon
was exhibiting?
A: Well, you know some of it certainly was related to the pain itself that
he was going through, but also he had, certainly, a preexisting propensity toward
being hostile or cynical or mistrustful of others.
Q: How do we know that from a clinical sense?
A: Well that was based on the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2
and then also just in his presentation. That his anger often seemed to be out of
proportion of what was going on at the moment. And his mistrust for what the
doctors were trying to move him, he just really got angry about that and reacted
very strongly. (Calhoun Depo., p. 12-13, ll. 5-7). [Emphasis added].

Some important elements exist

111

this exchange.

First, the definitiveness of Dr. Calhoun's

statement about this pre-existing propensity toward hostility, cynicism and mistrust of others is
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important. "Certainly.

is an echo of Dr. Calhoun's statement that he was

those around Mr. Gerdon would be able to observe the Claimant's hostility and
resentfulness. (Calhoun Depo., p. 33, 11. 20-23). As pointed out to the Commission and to the
Court in the prior briefing, those who knew Mr. Gerdon prior to his industrial injury not only did
not observe such actions, they observed the exact opposite personality. (Tr. p. 43, IL 13-17; p. 44
lL 1-2; p. 57, IL 1-6; p. 5811. 5-6, 12-13).
Second, this opinion was based on testing taken after the industrial injury as well as based
on "presentation" which occurred after the industrial injury. Dr. Calhoun is observing a subject,
the Claimant, after the event, and drawing conclusions about the state of the subject's condition
prior to the event by stating that what he observed existed before the event The logical analysis
of such thought requires the following proposition that Mr. Gerdon presents this way now in
testing and observation, so he must have presented this way before the industrial injury. Such a
logical analysis is self-creating, and therefore leads to the exclusion of evidence that does not fit
within that circle of reasoning.

Dr. Calhoun exhibits this same circular logic throughout his

testimony.

Q: Why do you do these types of tests? I mean, you've done these twice
on Mr. Gerdon. Why?
A: Well again to look at what the objective tests generate in terms of
personality makeup, coping skills, and then look for patterns over time.
And what concerns me with Mr. Gerdon is the chronicity of these pattersn,
these psychological patterns.
Q: What do the patterns tell you?
A. Just that they likely preexisted his injury. That he was one who was a
hostile individual prior to his injury, had anger issues, was certainly prone to
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depression, and that just seemed to
11. I 0-23
years. Calhoun Depo., p.

over through many evaluations over the

This selection agam emphasizes the Dr. Calhoun's certainty about the observability of the
Claimant's mental condition prior to the industrial injury, in this selection that the Claimant was
"certainly prone to depression" prior to the industrial injury. Id. This is in direct opposition to
actual observation of the Claimant prior to the industrial injury. Cody Campbell testified that
prior to the industrial injury the Claimant "was optimistic. The most optimist guy I have ever
met, actually. Just always trying to talk reason into you and show you the good side of
everything."

(Tr., p. 48-49, 11. 24-2). This is not someone who was "certainly prone to

depression." Dr. Calhoun testified that testing and frequent evaluations were important to look
for "patterns over time." The problem with the observations made by Dr. Calhoun was that all of
the observations were made after the industrial injury. Dr. Calhoun looked at a re-occurring
pattern after an event, the industrial injury, and drew a conclusion about what should exist prior
to that event, a continuation of that pattern. However, the evidence in the record, which the
Commission found was unrebutted and persuasive, shows that the pattern Dr. Calhoun expected
to see did not exist.

The pattern had insufficient evidence to reach the conclusion that Dr.

Calhoun sought to reach.
Dr. Calhoun addressed this possibility in the passage following the one cited above, but
did so referring back again to circular reasoning.
Q: I mean, is it possible for these tests to be indicating something that was
created by his industrial accident?
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Well I think they could
certainly, the industrial accident could
have exacerbated some of these ... (Calhoun Depo., pp. 27-28, 11. 24-4).

Here Dr. Calhoun acknowledges that the industrial accident "certainly" could have caused an
impact, an aggravation or worsening of the Claimant's personality traits of anger and hostility.

In the continuing portion of the passage of testimony Dr. Calhoun enters circular reasoning to
minimize such a conclusion.
A: but I think he was given the opportunity to be treated for these things
that were related to the industrial injury, but he just couldn't trust enough to
respond. He couldn't believe in his medical team, his psychological treatment,
enough to respond.
Q: And what do you relate that to?
A: Just those preexisting patterns of mistrust and cynicism, hostility and
dysthymia. (Calhoun Depo., pp. 28, 11 4-11 ).

Dr. Calhoun acknowledges that the industrial accident could change a Claimant's personality.
However he asserts that such changes were not at play in the current case because the Claimant
got treatment for his industrial injury, but at the same time states the treatment was in effectual
because he had a pattern of mistrust, cynicism and hostility, the very conditions which he
acknowledge could have been exacerbated by the industrial injury, but weren't because he got
treatment, which treatment was ineffectual.

Dr. Calhoun's logic follows a circular pattern

because it is based on an incomplete pattern, a pattern which only considered evidence observed
after the industrial injury.

Such a logic construction is erroneous, and reached an erroneous

conclusion, that Claimant's personality traits or anger and hostility pre-existed the industrial
injury. This conclusion is wrong, and can be tested by looking at Dr. Calhoun's pattern. Dr.
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analysis is that he observed a
injury, so that must

pattern of anger

hostility after the industrial

existed prior to the industrial injury. By examining whether that pattern

existed prior to the industrial injury, one can test Dr. Calhoun's conclusion whether the
Claimant's personality traits of anger and hostility preexisted the industrial injury and accident.
The Commission found that there was no pre-existing psychological treatment notes to
compare with.

This leaves the only evidence in the record of the Claimant's psychological

condition prior to the industrial injury as the observational testimony of Mickey and Racheal
Gerdon, and Jesse and Cody Campbell. Claimant's counsel has outlined and drawn comparisons
of this testimony in both Claimant's briefing before the Commission and in Claimant's initial
brief before this Court. It is sufficient at this juncture to state that the Commission found "their
testimony regarding the change in Claimant's personality following his industrial accident [as]

undisputed and persuasive." (Findings, p. 6). [Emphasis added].
To accept the testimonies of the Campbell's and Gerdon's as undisputed and persuasive
and at the same time to accept the pattern laid out by Dr. Calhoun is a logical impossibility
because Dr. Calhoun's interpretation of his pattern requires the existence of "certain" and "sure"
anger, hostility, mistrust, cynicism and depression observable by those around him prior to the
industrial injury. The undisputed testimony is that no such matters were observed, and instead
what was observed was "the most optimistic guy I have ever met." Concluding that Claimant's
personality traits of anger and hostility, 50% of the cause of his current depression, pre-existed
the industrial accident is wrong, it is clearly erroneous. The conclusion that fits the evidence is
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the one Dr. Calhoun rejected because it didn't fit his faulty pattern, "the industrial accident could
exacerbated some

these." (Calhoun Dcpo., p. 28, 11. 3-4).

Claimant agrees with Defendant that 50% of the depression is caused by the pain disorder
and 50% is caused by the Claimant's personality traits. However Claimant asserted below to the
Commission and to this Court that the totality of the evidence demonstrates that some portion of
Claimant's personality traits of anger, hostility, resentfulness and dysthymia are due to the
industrial accident and industrial injury. This means that the Industrial accident and industrial
injury are the predominant cause of the Claimant's current depressive symptoms, and that the
Commission erred by not appropriately considering the totality of the evidence, and therefore
reached a conclusion not based on substantial and competent evidence.

B. Dr. Marsh's Testimony and Records Support the Conclusion that the
Predominant Cause of the Claimant's Depression is the Industrial Accident and
Injurv

As stated repeatedly, the Claimant does bear the burden of proving the industrial accident
and injury were the predominant cause of the Claimant's psychological condition. However, the
Court has also held that "Magic words" are not necessary in addressing causation. Only that
"plain and unequivocal testimony conveying a conviction" of causation is offered." Jensen v.

City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412-13, 18 P.3d 211,217 (2001). While the burden of proof
might be different regarding J.C. § 72-451 injuries, the eviclentiary standard for what evidence
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should be considered is not. Dr. Marsh expressed a clear

unequivocal opinion regarding the

cause of the Claimant's current depression.
The Commission found Dr. Marsh's opinion "credible" but limited due to "its narrow
foundation." (Findings, p. 11 ). Defendants argue that because Dr. Marsh did not use the correct
wording in his opinion the opinion is of little value. The Court has always held that it is the
substance and basis of the opinion which is important, not wording.
No psychological treatment or testing exists establishing the Claimant's psychological
status prior to his 2008 industrial motor vehicle accident.

This means when reaching a

conclusion regarding causation we must rely upon non-medical evidence that existed at the time,
or try and draw conclusions from medical evidence created after the industrial accident and
injury. The analysis above shows the danger of relying exclusively on medical evidence created
after the industrial accident and injury: conclusions drawn from that evidence are inaccurate
when they cannot be correlated with evidence preexisting the accident and injury.
Dr. Marsh states that [he] "spend[ s] an inordinate amount of time asking historical
questions regarding people's pain and whatnot." (Marsh Depo., p. 8, 11. 14-16.) He also states
that it is "very" important to get histories from "folks other than the patients, such as family
members." (Marsh Depo.m p. 8, 11. 18-20). He reaffinned this particularly with psychological
concerns.
[l]ts important, especially when you're talking about people's psychological
status and behavior, because a lot of times people aren't sensitive to their own
you know, to how others are perceiving them and, you know how their actions are
affecting other people, and so they're just it helps to have an outside opinion.
(Marsh Depo., p. 9, 11. 8-14).
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Marsh treated the Claimant regularly since January 19, 2011

(Marsh Depo., p. 6, 11. 1

18).

Dr. Marsh spoke \vith the Claimant's mother and the Claimant about the Claimant's
psychological state regarding both his condition at the time of the examination, as well as prior
to the industrial accident and injury. (Marsh Depo., p. 23-26, 11. 18-7).
You take people they way they come, right? I mean, I'm sure he's -- I did ask
him about this at some point, and you, I asked if he' cl ever had depression, and
you know, what he acted like when he was a kid, and there's no indication, in my
mind, that he had a preexisting depressive disorder. So taking somebody like that
and then putting them through what he's been through, I think it's only logical
that his cunent psychological states is directly related to his chronic pain. (Marsh
Depo., p. 28, 11.

Both the Commission and the Employer/Surety latched on to the language Dr. Marsh used "you
take people they way they come" for the proposition that Dr. Marsh's opinion was insufficient
regarding a predominant cause standard. Findings, p. 12). The Commission in prior proceedings
addressing l.C. § 72-451 acknowledged that the Commission was still required to evaluate the
injured worker "as he is" when perfonning the predominant cause evaluation. Quinn v. Doug's

Fireplace Sales, Inc. 2014 IIC 0095.22 citing Smith v. Garland Construction Services, 2009
IIC 0179.8. This court affinned in In Warreu v. Williams & Parson PC CPAS, 157 Idaho 528,
337, P.3d 1257 (2014) that an employer/surety takes the employee "as he is, in cletennining the
predominant cause of a psychological condition."
Based on Dr. Marsh's regular treatment of the Claimant, the histories obtained, and his
professional experience, Dr. Marsh's is of the clear and unequivocal opinion that the industrial
accident and injury were the cause of the Claimant's current depression, and that Claimant did
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not

a pre-existing depressive disorder.

persuasive"

1s consistent

the "undisputed and

obser-:ed the Claimant prior to the industrial accident and

those

mJury.
Finding Dr. Marsh's opinion was narrow in foundation and inapplicable because it did
not use specific "magic words" is in error and not based on the evidence in the record.

C. The Court has Sufficient Evidence to Decide the Matter

Remand is not necessary as the evidence of the Claimant's pre-existing mental status is
clear based on the testimony and evidence in the record.

It was clear enough that the

Commission found it "undisputed and persuasive." (Findings, p. 6).

Where such factual

evidence is undisputed it should direct the findings of causation.
Should the Court detem1ine to so find, it is important to also address, as Claimant
presented to the Commission, that LC. § 72-451(5)'s diagnosis requirement is specific to issues
of impairment and disability.

In the present case, the parties were very specific to limit the

matter before the Commission as one of medical treatment. (Tr., p. 7-8, 11. 6-10.). Following the
rules of statutory interpretation the plain meaning of the wording of the statute is to be given
meaning. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho
551,557,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999). The Supreme Court has also routinely stated that "the tenns
of Idaho's worker's compensation statue are liberally construed in favor of the employee."

Haldiman v. Am. Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956-57, 793 P.2d 187 (1990). This all means that
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1(5)'s limitations are

applicable in those cases where

pcnnancnt impairment and permanent disability. This is especially true

Claimant is seeking
the matters of

impainnent were already before the Commission in a prior proceeding and decided.
The Court has sufficient evidence before it to decide the compensability of Mr.
Gerdon's psychological treatment, recommended by both Dr. Calhoun and Dr. Marsh.

D. Matters not Raised by the Parties are not to be Considered

The Court has been unequivocal in ruling that "when reviewing the decision of the
Commission, this Court is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments' that were presented
to the Commission below ... Consequently, we 'will not consider ar6,1.nnents raised for the first
time on appeal."' Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 Idaho 309,315,336 P.3d 242 (2014)
(quotations original) (citations omitted). As in this case, the Court has had occasion to reaffinn
that when a surety fails to raise an argument before the Commission, "It is well established that
arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be heard." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115
Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Before the Industrial Commission the Employer/Surety did not argue or raise any issue or
claim preclusion. "Defendants have not raised claim or issue preclusion as a defense to this
claim for psychological treatment. Therefore this issue will not be addressed." Findings p., 7.,
citing Deon v. H&J Inc., 157 Idaho 665, 339 P.3d 550 (2014). As the Court laid out in Deon to
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so sua

would be in err. Additionally it would be in applicable as the evidence and

testimony demonstrate that the Claimant is seeking for treatment \Vhieh arose, while due to the
industrial injury, since the last hearing on this matter. (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 33).

Ill.

CONCLUSION

The Commission committed error by not relying upon the whole record, especially those
elements it found to be "undisputed and persuasive" in reaching its conclusion. By doing so the
Commission reached a conclusion which was not supported by substantial and competent
evidence, and is clearly erroneous. As it is clearly erroneous the matter should be reversed and
the Court should find compensable the treatment sought by the Claimant.

DATED this _ _ day of November, 2015.
GOICOECHEA LAW

Attorneys for Claimant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

i

day of November, 2015, I caused to be

two (2)

true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Joseph M. Wager
LAW OFFICES OF KENT W. DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, Idaho 83 707

( ) Hand Delivery
( ~ Mail
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile: (800) 972-3213
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